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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper, we explore the role of model uncertainty in explaining the different findings 
in the literature regarding the effect of shall-issue right-to-carry concealed weapons laws 
on crime. In particular, we systematically examine how different modeling assumptions 
affect the results. We find little support for some widely used assumptions in the 
literature (e.g., population weights), but find that allowing for the effect of the law to be 
heterogeneous across both counties and over time is important for explaining the 
observed patterns of crime. In terms of model uncertainty, we find that there is 
substantial variation in the estimated effects for each model across all dimensions of the 
model space. This suggests that one should be cautious in using the results from any 
particular model to inform policy decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic expansion in the ability of 
US citizens to carry concealed weapons. The US Supreme Court’s 2008 District of 
Columbia vs. Heller decision established a personal right to carry arms. This decision 
made inevitable that all US states establish “may-issue” laws: laws which defined 
criteria under which a permit to issue concealed weapons may be obtained. A form of 
these laws, “shall-issue,” which require permits to be issued unless the applicant falls 
into certain narrow categories, have been adopted by 41 states. 38 of the shall-issue 
states adopted the law prior to the Supreme Court decision. Shall-issue laws essentially 
legalize concealed carry for the vast bulk of a state’s population. 
A key part of the policy debates preceding the adoption of shall-issue laws has 
been the claim that legalization reduces certain crime rates. The theoretical argument is 
that potential criminals considering crimes such as a street robbery will be deterred 
based on beliefs about the likelihood that a potential victim is carrying a weapon. 
Studies of the effects of shall-issue laws have also examined other violent crimes, such 
as murder and rape. This has been done both because the deterrence logic of 
concealed carry is generally felt not to hold for these types of crimes, and also because 
of arguments that concealed carry may increase violent crimes by creating 
opportunities, e.g., during a disagreement between people who are intoxicated. 
 Empirical evidence for these claims was initiated in work by Lott and Mustard 
(1997); other prominent examples of work arguing in favor of a deterrent effect include 
Lott (2000). This body of work in turn generated a set of studies which concluded that 
claims of a deterrence effect were wrong and an artifice of special modeling 
assumptions; e.g., Black and Nagin (1998), Ludwig (1998), and Ayres and Donohue 
(2003). While the various participants in this literature have subsequently argued in 
favor of their assumptions and criticized those of others, these further arguments have 
not produced any resolution of the conflicting empirical conclusions, nor is there good 
reason to think that they can. The different assumptions are not grounded in principled 
behavioral arguments, i.e., substantive assumptions about economic theory; nor do they 
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involve statistical distinctions for which there is a logical basis for preferring one 
approach to another.  
 This paper attempts to understand the conflicting claims in the concealed carry 
literature. We do this by systematically exploring how different modeling assumptions 
are linked to different findings on shall-issue’s effect on crime. We do not, ex ante, 
privilege any particular model, as is standard practice in this literature. We are 
concerned with the relative evidentiary support for a given model, as well as the crime 
effect found through model averaging, but our primary objective is to explore the 
evidentiary support across a set of models and to understand which assumptions do 
and do not matter. Our analysis identifies a set of categories which span much of the 
existing concealed carry literature. These assumptions range from specification of the 
nature of the policy effect to choices of control variables to heteroskedasticity 
corrections to formulations of potential parameter heterogeneity to choices of 
instrumental variables. A major goal is to understand how these assumptions determine 
the disparate findings in the literature.  
 The closest antecedents to this paper are Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and 
Nagin (2009), Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013), Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010), 
and Bartley and Cohen (1998). The first three papers attempted to adjudicate different 
claims about the deterrent effect of capital punishment and find that affirmative claims of 
deterrence were fragile in the sense that they required certain sets of modeling 
assumptions-assumptions which do not produce strong evidentiary support in 
comparison to other models.1 In particular, evidence of deterrence required 
homogeneity in the state-specific deterrence parameter as well as the use of a linear 
probability model. Bartley and Cohen (1998) used Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds 
analysis to adjudicate differences between Lott and Mustard (1997) and Black and 
Nagin (1998) with respect to various choices of control variables. Our analysis 
considers a much more systematic set of papers and assumptions and focuses on the 
nature of the heterogeneity results rather than a robustness analysis per se. Further, we 
employ model averaging rather than extreme bounds analysis as the basis for 
                                                 
1See Strnad (2007) for a general argument for the importance of accounting for model 
uncertainty in empirical legal studies. 
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aggregating information across models.2 Our work attempts to follow the spirit of 
Leamer (1978), who initiated systematic efforts to account for model uncertainty in 
evaluating empirical claims, although we do not focus on extreme bounds analysis per 
se. 
The modern literature on model uncertainty has focused on the development of 
model averaging methods to facilitate statistical inferences which are not model-
specific.3   Eduardo Ley played a foundational role in this work, which initially focused 
on the identification of the determinants of heterogeneity in growth rates across 
countries. Ley’s work, in combination with Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), 
provided a constructive way to address model uncertainty which has seen wide 
application, and hence the dedication. We will employ model averaging methods to 
summarize our exploration of the model space. However, our main goal is to 
understand how assumptions determine conclusions on the effects of concealed carry 
laws. 
 As the concealed carry literature is based on observational data, the research 
may be subjected to the standard critiques that are made by advocates of randomized 
controlled trials and natural experiments as the gold standard for empirical social 
science. A National Academy of Sciences report, Firearms and Violence (Wellford, 
Pepper, and Petrie (2004)), expressed deep pessimism about the possibility that 
observational data would be able to resolve the effect of shall issue laws 
 
“…with the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there is a causal 
link between the right to carry laws and crime rates…It is also the committee’s 
view that additional analysis along the lines of the current literature is unlikely to 
yield results that will persuasively demonstrate a causal link between right-to-
carry laws and crime rates (unless substantial numbers of states were to adopt 
or repeal right-to-carry laws), because of the sensitivity of the results to model 
specification.” (pg. 150-151)   
 
                                                 
2Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) discuss why model averaging has better decision-
theoretic foundations. 
3Draper (1995) and Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997) are seminal contributions 
from statistics; see Doppelhofer (2008) for a concise overview of applications in 
economics. 
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This claim led one of the members of the panel, the eminent criminologist James Q. 
Wilson, to dissent from the report, which is extremely rare. Wilson’s decision to dissent 
is primarily based on his objections to the report’s claims that the concealed carry 
literature was uninformative. Specifically, he criticizes the report for making this 
conclusion based on the conflicting results on the effects of legalization generated by 
models with and without controls. Wilson argues that models without controls, even if 
they contradict other models, are intrinsically uninteresting. 
 
“Suppose Professor Jones wrote a paper saying that increasing the number of 
police in a city reduced the crime rate and Professor Smith wrote a rival paper 
saying that cities with few police officers have low crime rates. Suppose that 
neither Smith nor Jones used any control variables, such as income, 
unemployment, population density, or the frequency with which offenders are 
sent to prison in reaching their conclusions. If such papers were published, they 
would be rejected by the committee out of hand for the obvious reason they 
failed to produce a complete account of the factors that affect the crime rate.” 
(pg. 270)  
 
Wilson’s dissent, in turn, invoked the rejoinder 
 
“…Everyone (including Wilson and the rest of the committee) agrees that 
control variables matter, but there is disagreement on the correct set. Thus the 
fact that there is no way to statistically test for the correct specification and that 
researchers using reasonable specifications find different answers are highly 
relevant. Given the existing data and methods, the rest of the committee sees 
little hope in resolving this fundamental statistical problem.” (pg. 273-274) 
 
As discussed in Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2008), Wilson has the stronger side of 
the argument. With reference to model uncertainty, model averaging and related 
methods can constructively address the issues raised by the majority in the report. And 
of course one can just as easily criticize assumptions implicit in randomized trials. Our 
position, which follows the spirit of Heckman (2005), is that there is no single privileged 
type of empirical strategy in economics, which does not mean that methodological 
arguments are vacuous, but rather that judgments need to be exercised with respect to 
assumptions.  
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Our empirical findings may be summarized as follows. Some assumptions in the 
literature, in particular the use of population weights to control for heteroskedasticity in 
crime rates and the use of linear time trends, have so little evidentiary support that they 
are reasonably excluded from the analysis. For the remaining assumptions, the effects 
of the law on crime range across positive and negative values. With a partial exception 
involving the specification of the way that shall-issue law effects are measured, there is 
no simple one-to-one mapping between any one assumption and uniformly positive or 
negative set of estimates conditional on the assumption. Together, the full range of 
assumption disagreements matter for the disagreements in conclusions.  
We also employ model averaging to provide a summary evaluation of the model-
specific estimates that we study. Interestingly, the posterior probabilities in the model 
space are almost entirely concentrated on a single model for both property and violent 
crimes, although the models turn out to differ. The model-averaged point estimates 
imply a weak negative (deterrent) effect on crime in the short run and a positive and 
increasing effect on crime in the long run.  
Together, we conclude that any strong claims about the effects of concealed 
carry legalization are fragile, at least based on the data and model space we examine. 
By the standard of Leamer’s extreme bounds analysis, in which changes of sign across 
a model space are equated to fragility, there is no assumption that can avoid fragility per 
se, although one assumption gives most effect estimates the same sign. Model 
averaging reveals that posterior probabilities pile onto a small set of models all of which 
include this assumption. However, for these models, the year by year effects of the law 
change sign. Hence it would take very special priors and a very special loss function to 
use our findings as evidence in favor of concealed carry. We believe our findings 
indicate why the same may be said about the papers whose findings we have attempted 
to analyze. 
 
 
 
2. Model uncertainty and policy effects: basic ideas  
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 Our objective in this analysis is to explicitly incorporate model uncertainty into 
descriptions of the evidentiary support for a given empirical claim. The standard 
approach to policy evaluation, abstractly, is simply the construction of the posterior 
probability for outcome o  conditional on policy p , data D , and a model m , 
 
 ( )Pr , ,o D p m   (1) 
 
This distribution can be used to compute first and second moments ( ), ,E o D p m  and 
( )var , ,o D p m , as well as the posterior probability of the data, which provides a measure 
of goodness of fit:   
 
 ( )Pr ,D p m   (2) 
 
Models may be understood as collections of assumptions which together provide 
a statistical specification (see Brock and Durlauf (2014) for elaboration). The new model 
uncertainty literature can be understood as relaxing the conditioning in equations (1) 
and (2) on a single model and providing new ways to report evidence on policy effects. 
Instead of a single model, one employs a set of candidate models, M ; elements m  of 
this set are differentiated by the assumptions from which they are constituted. From this 
perspective, the identity of the “true” model is one of the unobservables for which an 
analyst must account in drawing inferences. Further, the true model is itself of no 
intrinsic interest. The objective of a policy analysis is solely to evaluate the effect of the 
law on criminal behavior. 
When assumptions are justified by economic or econometric theory, then it is of 
course appropriate to condition empirical conclusions on them. If such a priori 
information exists, then a researcher is justified in employing a dogmatic prior on the 
model space, i.e., assigning ( )Pr 1m =  to some model. Similarly if some assumptions 
warrant a prior probability 1, then those models which contradict these assumptions 
should receive prior probability 0. However, for a context such as concealed carry and 
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crime, the differences in modeling assumptions which have been used in competing 
analyses do not, as we argue below, admit resolution on an a priori basis. While 
arguments can be made in favor of or against particular assumptions, the models in the 
literature are all plausible candidates for the crime process.  
This general critique of the use of a single model applies to the concealed carry 
literature at several levels. First, it means that there is no principled basis for functional 
form assumptions or for the choice of control variables that are found in a given model. 
Becker’s (1968) deterrence model involves the marginal costs and benefits of a 
potential crime, but is mute on the forms of the cost and benefit functions nor does the 
theory say anything about their determinants. Choices of functional forms and control 
variables involve judgments. Second, uncertainty exists with respect to the validity of 
instruments. Unsurprisingly, a number of crime determinants are endogenous and so 
instruments are used to account for correlation between them and the unobserved 
heterogeneity in crime rates across localities. However, the absence of a principled 
basis for constructing the crime model means that the literature has relied on ad hoc 
informal arguments for the validity of particular instruments.  
A third problem is that there is no reason to think that the parameters of a crime 
regression should be invariant to other characteristics (either measured or unmeasured) 
of the polities, i.e., it is not clear whether data taken across localities obeys the needed 
exchangeability assumptions which underlie analyses based on common coefficients. It 
is easy to identify reasons for parameter heterogeneity. For example, Southern states 
where people are taught at early ages how to handle weapons, and where guns are 
very much a part of the culture; and Northeastern states where guns are not common 
among regular citizens, can be expected to exhibit different coefficients in a crime 
regression that includes variables such as the conditional probability of arrest given 
crime commission, gun prevalence, or the presence of a concealed weapons carry law. 
The Lucas (1976) critique, further, can be argued to imply that the parameters in a 
regression of the type employed in the concealed carry literature will depend on the 
polity’s criminal sanction regime. 
All of these issues suggest that model uncertainty is likely to play a key role in 
crime regressions. In this respect, the literature on shall-issue carry laws is more of a 
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demonstration of sensitivity of policy effect calculations to model assumptions than a 
body of work from which conclusions may be drawn. In fact, if the deterrent effects are 
estimated because of their use in policy evaluation, decision theory requires that model 
uncertainty be part of the appropriate loss function calculation.  
Model averaging, when the loss function does not depend on the “true” model, 
provides a sufficient characterization of policy effects for policy comparisons if the 
policymaker is solving a standard statistical decision problem with uncertainty; see 
Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) for a formal argument and elaboration. However, there 
are good reasons why the averaging the probabilities in (2) across models may not be 
sufficient for an analysis whose objective is to communicate evidence on policy effects. 
One reason concerns the specification of the priors on the model space. We regard this 
as a qualitatively different problem from the specification of priors for model-specific 
parameters. Why? While we have argued that there are not good reasons to possess 
dogmatic priors based on economic or statistical theory, at least for the context we 
study, this claim does not speak to the issue of how to construct priors for the model 
space.  
Consider the case in which there is model uncertainty depending on whether one 
assumes rational or adaptive expectations in an environment. Different economists 
would have very different priors based on the totality of social science knowledge each 
possesses, or because each evaluates a common knowledge set differently in terms of 
its implications for which model is correct. While the concealed carry literature does not 
contain such stark disagreements on economic principles, authors have made 
principled arguments in favor of various assumptions, which means that priors over the 
model space would range widely. 
The judgments which underlie an element of a model space reflect different 
views on assumptions, so while it be reasonable to ask a policymaker to relax a 
dogmatic model space prior, it is not reasonable to expect him to only be interested in 
results in which assumptions or their negation receive equal a priori weight. Second, the 
literature on model robustness (Hansen and Sargent (2007)) has given reasons to 
believe that preferences can exhibit ambiguity aversion with respect to model 
uncertainty. In such cases, the worst case scenario for a policy will depend on the 
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identity of the true model, which in turn cannot be determined independently from the 
policymaker’s preferences.  
These considerations suggest that it is valuable to report information about the 
distribution of policy effects associated with (1) and (2). As initially suggested in Brock, 
Durlauf, and West (2007), policy dispersion plots, which visually represent the set of 
values of a policy effect across a model space, are useful in helping a policymaker to 
understand policy-effect/model dependence. Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013) extend 
this idea by creating dispersion plots in which they organize models by classes of 
assumptions, allowing a reader to identify which assumptions do and do not matter for 
heterogeneity in model-specific policy effects. Hence, while model averaging is the best 
way to provide scalar statistics (e.g., moments) for a policy effect, we believe policy 
dispersion plots are useful as well. 
 
Frequentist vs. Bayesian approaches 
 
 While our discussion of model uncertainty has employed Bayesian language, we 
will report frequentist estimates. When we engage in model averaging, this produces a 
“Bayes-Frequentist hybrid,” a combination that first appeared in economics in Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), who dubbed it Bayesian Averaging of Classical 
Estimates (BACE). We employ a hybrid in order to maintain comparability with the 
existing literature. While there are assumptions under which point estimates and 
standard errors can be equated to or will approximate posterior means and variances 
(see discussion in Raftery (1995) for example), our preferred interpretation is simply that 
we are providing information on the sensitivity of policy effects to model specification, 
with what we call model posteriors providing information on relative goodness of fit, 
adjusted for model complexity.  
 
 
3. Model space 
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As we have emphasized, the lack of scholarly consensus over the effect of 
concealed carry laws on crime has centered on differences in the modeling choices 
employed by various researchers. Since there is essentially an infinite number of 
modeling choices available to a researcher, we employ the notion of exchangeability as 
a guiding principle. The basic idea is to consider whether the model selected by the 
researcher eliminates enough differences between (sets) of observations, e.g., Alameda 
county in California and Jackson county in Mississippi, that one can assume that the 
residuals are no longer a function of the identity of the particular observation. This is not 
to say that violating exchangeability invalidates a model. Instead one should consider 
whether the sources of non-exchangeability invalidate the purpose for which the model 
was built. Hence, when choosing a model space, we consider aspects like control 
variable choice, specification of the effect of the law, heterogeneity in the effect of the 
law both in the cross-section and over time, etc., that may lead to violations in 
exchangeability that are likely to affect our estimates of the effect of the law on crime.  
The model space we consider in this paper takes into account some of the key 
sources of debate in the literature including modeling how the effect of the law varies 
over time, controlling for demographics, modeling time trends in crime rates, and 
dealing with the potential endogeneity of the laws. In addition, we also include some 
dimensions to the model space that we feel are particularly relevant to the issue, but 
that have received little or no attention in the literature. This includes the introduction of 
additional relevant control variables, allowing the parameters of interest to be 
heterogeneous, dealing with the potential endogeneity of arrest rates, and the use of 
population weights. Below we discuss each dimension of the model space in detail. In 
addition to identifying assumptions which differentiate existing papers, we also note 
some cases in which the literature seems to have ignored some natural variations of 
those specifications which have appeared so far. 
 
i. formulation of shall issue laws as a crime determinant 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been disagreement in the literature as to the 
formulation of the impact of shall-issue laws in the statistical crime model. These 
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disagreements depend on how one characterizes the dynamic effects of legalization. 
The first part of the literature identified concealed carry effects using a dummy variable 
to indicate whether the law is in place or not in a given location-time pair. This 
specification has a substantive implication, as it entails that the introduction of the law 
generates a permanent shift up or down in the crime rate. However, suppose that crime 
rates were increasing in a location prior to the implementation of the law. Suppose 
further that the effect of the law was to reverse this trend, generating a subsequent 
decreasing rate of crime. If one just measured crime before and after the introduction of 
the law, average crime rates would be similar, leading to the incorrect conclusion that 
the law had little or no effect on crime.  
An alternative to the dummy variable model that seeks to account for this 
possibility, is to allow for different time trends in crime before and after the law. This 
approach has been used in John Lott’s work (Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (2000)), and 
has been referred to in the literature as the “spline” model (Ayres and Donohue (2003)). 
If we let ,i tY  denote the log of the crime rate in county i  at time t , and 0t  denote the 
time at which the law is implemented, a (very basic) spline model can be written as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )π π = − > + < + , 0 0 0 ,1 1i t b ia tY t t t t t t  .  (3) 
 
Here π π and b a  measure the trends before and after the law is implemented.  
The spline model of equation (3) allows for pre- and post-law trends. However, it 
does not allow for the law to have any immediate impact on crime. As a response, a 
“hybrid” specification proposed by Ayres and Donohue (2003) incorporates both the 
trends of the spline model as well as the discrete shift allowed by the dummy model.  
These two models are an attempt to account for differing temporal effects of the 
law in order to improve on the pure dummy model. However, they both have the feature 
that, as time elapses, the trend will keep pushing crime either up or down indefinitely. 
As we illustrate next, this feature can lead to paradoxical results.  
Take the example in Figure 1 which shows a case in which crime rates are 
decreasing, then the law is implemented, the trend flattens and after a few years the 
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trend flattens even more. The real effect of the law is that it worsens crime (since it was 
decreasing at a higher rate before the law was implemented) in the short run, and 
makes it even worse in the long run.  
How will a hybrid trend specification behave relative to this hypothetical pattern? 
The pre-law trend will match exactly the real trend, but the post-law trend will 
overestimate the effect in the short run and underestimate it in the long run. More 
importantly, the dummy will show an immediate shift to a lower crime rate, i.e., it will 
show that the law decreased crime immediately, even though the only effect of the law 
is to worsen crime both in the short run and in the long run. The point we want to 
illustrate is that one should be very careful when interpreting estimates from these 
models, a task that gets even harder once the effect of the law is allowed to depend on 
other variables as well (as we do in the section on parameter heterogeneity below).  
 
ii. control variables 
 
Another important source of disagreement surrounds the selection of control 
variables to include in the empirical model.4 These disagreements involve different 
types of variables.  
It is common to include control variables for socio-economic status, age, and 
gender, in aggregated empirical analyses of crime. While their inclusion is, abstractly, 
justified by choice-theoretic models of criminal behavior such as Becker (1968), there 
are many potential measures of these underlying characteristics which are available for 
use, and theory does not provide guidance on how to proceed. For example, Lott 
includes a set of dummy variables interacting gender, race (white, black, and other), 
and age (divided into six age bins). In contrast, Ayres and Donohue (2003) argue that 
the number of such variables is excessive due to these variables being highly collinear 
and suggest including only the subset pertaining to black and white males, since these 
groups contribute to the vast majority of crime. They find that limiting the set of 
                                                 
4For a discussion of these issues related to measuring the effect of the death penalty on 
murder see Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan, and Nagin (2009), and Durlauf, Fu, and 
Navarro (2013). 
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demographic controls causes significant changes in the estimated effect of gun laws on 
crime, and in some instances leads to a change in the sign of the effect 
In addition to differences in demographics across localities, there may be other 
factors related to location that are relevant for explaining crime rates. For example, 
attitudes towards gun safety, violence, or even gun usage in general may differ across 
various parts of the country. County-level fixed effects are one way to control for these 
differences, and are commonly included in empirical models. However, fixed effects do 
not capture any time-varying differences across counties. In order to address this, we 
consider two additional variables that vary across both county and time and are 
potentially related to both crime rates and gun control laws: gun prevalence and the 
level of urbanization. 
If one believes that the legalization of concealed weapons has an effect on 
crime rates, then the same logic justifying this makes it plausible that the prevalence of 
guns in the population directly affects crime. Since the presence of shall-issue laws 
and the degree of gun prevalence might be correlated, one may want to include a 
measure of gun prevalence in the regression equation.  
While gun prevalence is not a standard control variable in the literature, there 
are a few papers that include it. However, as is the case with demographic controls, 
there is no consensus on the effect of inclusion. Duggan (2001) estimates a positive 
correlation between gun prevalence and crime rates, but finds that controlling for gun 
prevalence does not affect the relationship between gun laws and crime. Moody and 
Marvel (2005) look only at the correlation between guns prevalence and crime, but find 
no systematic relationship. They attribute the difference between their results and 
Duggan’s to the choice of proxy variable for gun prevalence and differences in the 
number of control variables for age included in the regressions.  
In addition to controlling for gun prevalence, we also expand the model space 
by introducing a measure of the level of urbanization in a county as a control variable. 
As is the case with gun prevalence, the degree to which a county is urban or rural may 
be related to both crime rates and the probability that a concealed-carry law is in 
place.  
 
14 
 
iii. time trends  
 
Aggregate crime data often contain low frequency movements which are 
unexplained relative to the substantive theoretical commitments involved in a crime 
regression. As a result, there is controversy over how to model this type of unobserved 
heterogeneity, which involves the specification of time trends.5 One option is to include 
time-specific dummy variables that control for changes in crimes rates that affect all 
localities equally. This allows for full flexibility in how crime rates evolve over time, but 
does not allow these effects to vary by location. An alternative option is to include 
region-time trends, which allow for differences across region, at the expense of less 
flexibility in the time dimension.  
 
iv. parameter heterogeneity 
 
A fourth source of model uncertainty is parameter heterogeneity. While 
parameter heterogeneity has not been systematically explored in the concealed carry 
literature, it has been shown to matter in other crime contexts, e.g., Shepherd (2004). 
One exception is Black and Nagin (1998) who argue that affirmative evidence that 
concealed carry reduces crime is sensitive to whether or not data from Florida are 
included in the analysis. Black and Nagin argue that this sensitivity reflects the effects of 
the Mariel boatlift on crime rates; concealed carry legalization in Florida occurs during 
the post-boatlift crime increase, whose reduction Black and Nagin attribute to the 
absorption of this population into Florida society and the identification of criminals who 
came in the boatlift, not concealed carry per se. 
Black and Nagin’s argument should be understood in the context of whether 
crime observations from different US counties can be thought of as draws from a 
common model with fixed parameters.6 Essentially, the issue is whether, after 
controlling for a large set of variables, one should assume that the effect of concealed 
                                                 
5See Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2008) for further discussion.  
6Brock and Durlauf (2001) provide an analysis of parameter heterogeneity as an 
example of an exchangeability violation and discuss how such violations can, if not 
accounted for, create spurious policy conclusions.  
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carry on crime is independent of the identity of the observation. For example, should 
one assume that the effect of the law is the same for county-time pairs where gun 
prevalence is very large as for county-time pairs in which there are few guns amongst 
the population?   
The vast majority of the literature implicitly assumes that the effects of a policy, in 
this case shall-issue laws, are the same for all states and counties, in all time periods.7,8  
However, the response of crime rates to these laws may depend on a number of 
factors. We consider three factors that we believe could create heterogeneity in the 
effects of gun laws.  
First, we allow for the laws to have differing effects depending on the level of 
urbanization in a county. Response to the laws may be very different in rural versus 
urban areas. For example, in rural areas, since people are more spread out, there may 
be fewer confrontations involving weapons. It may also be the case that in rural areas 
people know each other better, and therefore are more informed about who has a 
weapon and who does not, potentially altering the benefit of having a concealed 
weapon. 
We also include a specification that allows for the effects of the laws to vary by 
region. Some regions may have differing attitudes regarding the use and safety of 
firearms, which could lead to different effects of the law. 
Finally, we allow for the effects of the laws to depend on the prevalence of guns 
in a county. Since shall-issue laws allow individuals to carry concealed weapons, these 
laws could have a very different effect in areas with very few guns to begin with, 
compared to areas with many guns. For example, allowing people to carry concealed 
weapons in a place where gun prevalence is very low, might have a small effect on 
crime as very few people have guns. From the perspective of a criminal, the probability 
                                                 
7Examples of papers which allow for parameter heterogeneity in a crime context are 
Black and Nagin (1998), Shepherd (2005), Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010), and 
Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2013). 
8The spline and hybrid models discussed above allow for the law to affect the linear 
trend in crime rates, but do not allow the effect to depend on calendar time, nor do they 
allow for non-linear trends. 
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of ending up in a confrontation with an armed victim is minimal, even if they are allowed 
to carry concealed weapons in principle.   
 
v. instrumental variables 
   
The concealed carry literature has attempted to address the endogeneity of the 
timing of legalization. Intuitively, relatively high (or low) crime rates may have 
determined which laws are passed, and not the other way around. We follow the 
convention in the literature and use the Republican vote share in the most recent 
presidential election to instrument for the laws.9 
An additional concern that has received less attention in the literature is that the 
arrest rates for various crimes may also be endogenously determined. For example, if a 
county experiences an increase in the rate of a given crime, it may find it more difficult 
to find and arrest the perpetrators of those crimes with a given set of police resources. 
Alternatively, a county may respond to an increase in crime by allocating additional 
resources towards catching criminals. In either case, arrest rates would be endogenous.  
In order to control for the endogeneity of arrest rates, we employ an instrumental 
variable strategy that is common in other literatures, particularly industrial organization, 
but to our knowledge has not been applied in crime contexts. We use the so-called 
Hausman-Nevo instruments (see Hausman (1995) and Nevo (2001)). These 
instruments exploit the panel structure of the data, and are constructed as a function 
(often the average) of the endogenous variable in other locations. In our context, we 
implement this in the following way. For each county-time pair, we compute the average 
arrest rate in all regions of the US in that period, excluding the region in which that 
county is located.  
The identifying assumption behind this instrumental variable strategy is that 
arrest rates for a given type of crime are correlated across different counties (for 
instance, it may be easier to catch perpetrators of certain types of crimes), but the arrest 
                                                 
9The Republican vote share is used extensively in the literature as an instrument for 
shall-issue laws, e.g., Lott and Mustard (1997), Ayres and Donohue (2003), among 
many others. 
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rates in other regions of the US do not endogenously respond to variation in the local 
crime rate. 
 
vi. population weights 
 
Our final form of model uncertainty centers on population weights. The use of 
population weights has become standard practice in empirical crime studies. There are 
various reasons for why one may want to include weights, but the usual argument is 
based on concern regarding heteroskedasticity of the residuals. The intuition for wanting 
to weight aggregate observations (typically at the state or county level) is the following. 
Consider a simple linear probability model for the probability an individual j in county i in 
period t commits a crime , ,j i tρ : 
 
 , , , , , , ,j i t j i t j i tXρ β η′= +   (4) 
 
where , ,j i tX  is a vector of observable characteristics, and , ,j i tη  is a mean-zero error term 
with variance 2σ . If we average this equation over individuals within each county and 
period, we obtain the following model for the county-time-specific crime rate: 
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 and  ,i tN  is the number of individuals in county c  in period t.  
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Since the residual in this new equation is given by 
,
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i t
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ε ==
∑
, its variance will be 
given by 
2
,i tN
σ . The aggregate residual, the one obtained by running county-level panel 
data regressions, is therefore heteroskedastic in proportion to the county population. 
Weighting by population makes the residual homoskedastic and generates the correct 
standard errors in a regression. 
However, this argument ignores the possibility that location-time-specific 
unobservables are present, which we denote as ,i tψ . With individual-level data, we 
could directly control for this form of heterogeneity using distinct location-specific, time-
specific, and location-time-specific fixed effects. However, since we only observe 
county-level aggregate data, unobserved determinants of the crime rate that vary by 
location and over time, such as unmeasured demographic and socio-economic factors, 
as well as any other crime-related policy changes will enter the error term via ,i tψ . 
Adding them to equation (5) gives us the following equation for the county-level crime 
rate: 
 
 , , ,' ,i t i t i tP X γ ν= +   (6) 
 
where , , ,i t i t i tν ψ ε= + . Since the average population in a county is over 100,000, and the 
variance of ε  is equal to 
2
,i tN
σ , the variance of ε  will tend to be quite small. Therefore, 
unless the variation in county-level unobservables is extremely small in relation to 
variation in individual unobservable determinants of crime, the variance of error term in 
equation (6) will be dominated by the variance of ,i tψ . Consequently, the use of 
population weights will overweight observations from more populous counties, leading 
to invalid confidence intervals, and potentially misleading point estimates. 
Our model space consists of all possible combinations of the model elements 
described above. The size of the model space is then the product of the dimensions of 
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each element: formulation of the law’s effect on crime (3), demographic controls (2), 
additional covariates (3), time effects (2), parameter heterogeneity—none, gun 
prevalence (GP), urban, region, GP and urban, GP and region (6), IV/non IV (2), and 
population weights (2). 
When we include interactions between the effect of shall-issue laws with gun 
prevalence, urbanization, and region we also separately include these variables as 
controls. As a result some models already contain the additional covariates (gun 
prevalence and urban dummies).10 This leaves us with 624 distinct models, for each 
property and violent crime. In order to organize our discussion of the model space, we 
first define a baseline model and then fill out the model space by considering deviations 
from this baseline in each possible dimension. See Figure 2 for a characterization of the 
model space. 
All models employ the log of the crime rate per 100,000 people as the dependent 
variable. Covariates which always appear are a measure of the shall-issue law, the 
arrest rate, socio-economic controls, age and race controls, time effects, and county 
fixed effects. All of the models under consideration are variations of this baseline 
specification: 
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10Region dummies are already implicit in every model given the presence of county-
level fixed effects. 
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In the baseline model, both the shall-issue laws and the arrest rate are treated as 
endogenous. As we discussed above, we use the share of people who voted 
Republican in the most recent presidential election and the average arrest rate in the 
other regions of the county to instrument for each variable respectively. 
 
 
4. Implementation 
 
In this section we discuss issues related to estimating all the models contained in 
the model space described above.  
While straightforward in principle, the calculations of some objects we use may 
be complicated. The posterior probability of the data given the model has the form 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )θ θ θ= ∫Pr Pr , Prm m mD m D m m d   (8) 
 
Integrals of this form, however, can be very hard to calculate numerically. To see why, 
consider a Monte Carlo estimator for (8) with diffuse priors on mθ . In this case, most of 
the values for mθ  that one would sample to calculate the integral will have very small 
likelihood (especially if the posterior is concentrated relative to the prior) and the 
variance of the estimated integral will be large. As a consequence one would need to 
take an enormous number of draws from the prior in order to obtain precise estimates of 
the integral in equation (8), otherwise the estimates will be numerically unstable. 
Closed form solutions and good approximations for some specific models with 
specific priors exist which avoid the explicit calculation of the right hand side of (8) (eg. 
Eicher, Lenkoskia and Raftery (2009)). These results, however, do not generalize to 
panel data models, mixed effects, and heteroskedasticity, and so cannot be applied to 
the statistical models which are used to evaluate concealed carry laws. In order to avoid 
these numerical instabilities, we employ the harmonic mean estimator of Newton and 
Raftery (1994),   
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 ( ) ( )
θ
θ
− = ∫1
1Pr
Pr , mm
D m d
D m
  (9) 
 
Since this estimator is based on samples from the posterior distribution, instead of from 
the prior, it avoids the problem of having most of the draws coming from low (or zero) 
likelihood regions of the support of mθ . 
Estimation is performed via a MCMC Gibbs sampler. The most general version of 
the class of models we estimate is an instrumental variables model with county fixed 
effects and population weights. Since all of the models we consider are special cases of 
this, we only discuss how to implement the general version that includes all of these 
features.  
 Let 1,...,i I=  index counties and 1,...,t T=  index time. The general version of the 
model can be written as 
 
 , , , ,''i t i t t i tiiY X Wβ α ψ ++ +=    (10) 
 
where the 1,...,j J=  elements of ,i tX  are potentially correlated with ,i t  (i.e., 
endogenous) while the 1,...,h H=  elements of ,i tW  are assumed exogenous. When we 
estimate models where the law and the arrest rate are assumed exogenous, we simply 
make ,i tX  a subset of ,i tW . We also assume access to a set of 1,...,k K=  instruments  
,i tZ  such that 
 
 , , , , ,, ,''i t j i t j i t j i t ji jX Z Wγ λ υζ ++= +   (11) 
 
for all j , with both ,i tZ  and ,i tW  assumed to be independent of , ,i t jυ .  
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Let ,i tQ  denote the population of county i  at time t , and let , ,i t i tq Q= .
11 To 
allow for heteroskedastic errors, we assume that ,, , ,
, ,
~ 0, , ~ 0, v ji t i t j
i t i t
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independent from , .ψ ζ  This allows us to define new random variables 
( ), , , ~ 0,i t i t i tq N εε τ=   and ( ), , , ~ 0,i t i t i t vv q Nυ τ=  such that  
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For the moment we do not specify anything about the dependence of ,ψ ζ  on either 
,X W and/or Z .   
To construct the Gibbs sampler, we employ an Empirical Bayes approach in 
which we first estimate the parameters ,γ λ  and fix them throughout the rest of the 
analysis. The full details of the algorithm we employ can be found in Durlauf, Navarro 
and Rivers (2014); here we sketch the basic ideas.  
The first step in estimation of the model involves the county fixed effects. 
Traditional Bayesian approaches deal with fixed effects using a “mixed” effect strategy 
in which the distribution of the effect is parameterized, allowing it to depend on 
moments of the distribution of , ,X W Z . This approach introduces many additional 
parameters to estimate, which increases the computational burden, and may lead to 
imprecision in estimates of the parameters of interest. Furthermore, there is no basis for 
imposing any particular dependence structure between , ,X W Z  and ,ψ ζ , or making 
particular distributional assumptions on ,ψ ζ . As we discuss below, adopting traditional 
methods to remove the fixed effects (i.e., within or first differencing), present both 
implementational and empirical challenges that make them unappealing in our context.  
                                                 
11For models that do not include population weights, ,i tQ  may be set equal to 1 without 
loss of generality. 
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Instead, we introduce a new procedure, which we call “random first differencing”, 
that eliminates the fixed effects by differencing the data with respect to a fixed, but 
randomly chosen period. To see how this procedure works, let ir  denote a random 
period in which county i  is observed in the data and, for any random variable V , let 
, , , ii t i t i r
V V V∆ = − . By taking differences with respect to the randomly chosen period ir , we 
have 
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The main advantage of this “random first differencing” procedure is that, if we complete 
the data and condition on , ii rε  (and the observed iq ), then 
,,
, ,
i
i
ii t
ri i
r
tq q
εε
−  will be independent 
over time, and the same is true for jv .  
By comparison, using the traditional within differencing approach leads to a 
complicated joint distribution of the errors over time. This substantially increases the 
computational burden of the algorithm compared to the conditionally i.i.d. data 
generated by our procedure.  
Random first differencing also solves the problem associated with just first-
differencing the data when you have a dummy variable that switches only once per 
county (as we do for the case of the law). In this case, the only identifying power in the 
data is given by that one period switch in the dummy, causing the researcher to rely on 
a very small portion of the variation in the data. Our procedure also overcomes the 
difficulties associated with differencing with respect to a fixed period, in which case the 
results can be sensitive to the period that is chosen.12  
                                                 
12By doing random first differencing, we are effectively integrating against the 
distribution of the data, which leads to something that resembles the within differences 
fixed effect type estimator. 
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In order to deal with the potential heteroskedasticity associated with population 
weights, we simply pre-multiply the random first differenced data by ,i tq . Letting 
( ),,, , , ii tqi t i t i rV q V V∆ = −  for any random variable V , the model is given by 
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The remaining step for implementation is  the specification of priors for the 
parameters. For the regression coefficients ,β α  we specify independent uniform priors 
( ),U a a−  for a  “large” (we employ 500a = ). In order to specify priors for the 
distributions of the residuals, notice that one can rewrite the crime equation as 
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Let , , 1 , ,
1
t
J
i t J i j i t
j
v v β ε+
=
+= ∑   and define ( ), , ,1 , 1, , ,,, ,i t i t i t iJ t Jv v v v +… ′=  as the 1 1J + ×  vector of 
SUR residuals for county i  at time t . We assume ( )1, ~ 0,i tv N −Π , where Π  is the 
precision matrix of the SUR equations.13 Finally, for Π  we assume a proper Wishart 
prior, ( )~ ,W b VΠ , set 1b J= +  (i.e., the least informative proper Wishart prior) and set 
V  to be an identity matrix divided by the number of observations. 
The key to deriving our Gibbs sampling algorithm is that, conditional on the 
random variable pair , ,,i ii r i rvε , equation (14) is a standard instrumental variables model. 
                                                 
13Notice that the normality assumptions are in no way crucial since they can be replaced 
by more flexible distributions like mixtures of normals. 
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The only difference is that we then have to derive the posterior distribution for , ,,i ii r i rvε . 
Details of the Gibbs sampling algorithm are given in Durlauf, Navarro and Rivers (2014).  
Finally, we discuss how we calculate the marginal likelihood of the data. 
Calculating the marginal likelihood using the harmonic mean estimator in equation (9), 
requires us to evaluate the conditional likelihoods for each model. Deriving the 
conditional likelihood for non-IV models is straightforward. Let ( ),1 ,,...,i i Tii ∆∆ ∆
′
=   . In this 
case, 
 
 ( ) ( )'Pr | , ,
i
m i i
i
D m f Y Wθ α∆ ∆ ∆= −∏   (16) 
 
where 
i
f ∆  is the iT  dimensional multivariate normal density defined by i
∆ . 
Since our focus is on comparing models based on how well they explain crime 
rates, for IV models we compute the conditional likelihood based only on the partial 
likelihood of the outcome equation (10), taking first random differences in order to 
eliminate the county fixed effects. Let ( ), ,1, , ,,...,i j i j i T jiv vω∆ ∆ ∆=
′ , the iT  dimensional vector of 
residuals from the thj  first stage regression, and let ( ),,1,..., i Ji iω ω ω∆ ∆ ∆ ′= . The partial 
likelihood is then given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ), , , ' ', |Pr | , , ., , iii t i it i t iit i imY X W Z f Y Wm Xωθ β α∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ = − −∏    (17) 
 
 
5. Data 
 
The main source of data for this paper is a county-level panel dataset covering 
1979-2000, and various versions have been used extensively in previous studies on the 
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effect of shall-issue laws on crime.14,15 The dataset consists of information on crime 
rates and arrest rates for various crime categories that comes from the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reports. This is supplemented with data on the presence of shall-issue laws in 
each state. The dataset also contains information from the U.S. Census Bureau on a 
wide set of socio-economic and demographic controls. 
In order to expand the model space, we add some additional variables to the 
dataset. First, we introduce a measure of gun prevalence used previously by Moody 
and Marvell (2005). Moody and Marvell use the data collected by Duggan (2001) from 
the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 
which includes questions related to gun ownership. According to Moody and Marvell, 
this is the only direct measure of gun ownership at the state level.  
One drawback of the survey is that it only covers 3000 people, and it is not asked 
in every state in every year. In order to deal with this, Moody and Marvell show that the 
percentage of suicides that were committed using guns is a good proxy for gun 
ownership as measured by the survey. Therefore, we collected data on the percentage 
of gun suicides from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(http://wonder.cdc.gov/).16 We then scaled this percentage by the correlation between 
gun ownership and gun suicides found by Moody and Marvell, and use this as our 
measure of gun prevalence in our empirical analysis. 
We also collected data from the U.S. Census Bureau that measures the 
percentage of people living in urban areas. We define a county as urban if more than 
70% of the population live in urban areas and define it as rural if less than 30% live in 
urban areas. Our results are robust to alternative choices of cutoffs and to the use of a 
continuous measure of urbanization. 
                                                 
14Papers using this dataset include Lott and Mustard (1997), Bartley and Cohen (1998), 
Black and Nagin (1998), Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998), Lott (2000), Plassmann and 
Tideman (2001), Ayres and Donohue (2003, 2009a, 2009b), Moody and Marvell (2008, 
2009), Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang (2011), among many others. 
15The data set we employ was downloaded from John Lott’s website 
http://www.johnlott.org in January 2013. 
16These data are available at both the county and state levels. However, due to 
confidentiality concerns, this data is not reported if the total number of suicides, or 
number of suicides by guns, is too low. As a result, data are missing for a large number 
of county-level observations. Therefore, we use the state-level data in our analysis. 
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The original dataset includes a measure of the percentage of the population that 
voted Republican in the most recent Presidential election. However, this variable only 
goes up to 1998, so we updated this series to 2000 using data collected from the Atlas 
of US Presidential Elections (http://www.uselectionatlas.org). 
  
 
6. Defining effects 
 
Since the dummy, spline, and hybrid specifications differ in how the law enters 
the model, and because we have some specifications in which the effects of the law 
vary across observations, there is no single parameter that can be used to compare 
the results of the different models. In order to compare the results across models, we 
compare the crime rates for each observation when we allow the law to be in effect 
versus when it is not. We call this the marginal effect of the law. We focus on average 
marginal effects (AME) of the law, where we average the effect over all states in 1998. 
This means that we are calculating the change in the crime rate which would have 
occurred if all states had legalized shall issue in 1998. We compute the effect of the 
law at implementation, as well as one and two years afterwards. We also calculate the 
average across all three periods. The primary reason for this is that the spline and 
hybrid models allow the effect of the law to vary over time.17 In order to capture this, 
we measure the effect of the law over this three-year window, allowing the values of 
controls to evolve over the same three-year window. 
Other types of policy effects can be calculated. One alternative, which we call 
AME-Law measures the average effect of the law for only those states which had 
actually implemented shall issue by 1998, using a three-year window for crime rates 
                                                 
17The average marginal effects also vary over time when we allow the effect of the law 
to depend on certain characteristics of the county (e.g., gun prevalence and the level of 
urbanization). While the levels of gun prevalence and urbanization do change over time, 
these changes are typically small. 
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and controls.18 As a complement to this, we also compute AME-No Law, which 
measures the effect for states that did not implement the law during our sample period. 
These two measures allow for the possibility that states which implemented the law 
and those who did not were aware of the heterogeneity in its effects. Our main 
measure of the effect of the law, AME, is a weighted average of AME-Law and AME-
No Law. 
In total this gives us twelve different average marginal effect estimates for each 
model.19 We compute each of these marginal effect measures for all models in the 
model space. In order to focus our discussion, we primarily use the version that 
measures the effect for all states (AME), and we use the average of this measure 
across all three years. We discuss the cases in which there are important differences 
between the various measures and their corresponding relevance for gun control 
policy. 
 
 
7. Preliminary analysis and identification of a policy-relevant model space 
 
A standard issue in exploring model spaces concerns the high dimension of the 
space. Madigan and Raftery (1994) propose a way of decreasing a set of candidate 
models by eliminating highly improbable ones via a procedure they call “Occam’s 
Window”. The basic idea of the procedure is to set a threshold for a model’s posterior 
probability and to then eliminate models with lower probabilities than this threshold. For 
the context of understanding the role of assumptions in outcomes, we follow the spirit of 
the “Occam’s Window” procedure by checking whether certain assumptions are 
associated with qualitatively lower likelihoods than their (contradictory) counterparts, 
and so resolve such cases based on goodness of fit. We start with this evaluation in 
                                                 
18We also computed the average marginal effect for only states that implemented the 
law, evaluated when the law was implemented in each state, instead of in 1998. The 
results were very similar. 
19We compute each of the three AME measures for each of the three years following 
the introduction of the law, as well as an average over these three years, for a total of 
four estimates per AME measure. 
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order to allow subsequent analyses to focus on assumptions which possess non-
negligible posterior weights. Specifically, we identify assumptions such that the model 
with the highest likelihood from those maintaining the assumption still has a lower 
likelihood that the model with the lowest likelihood among models which do not maintain 
it. There are two assumptions whose associated models are dominated by the posterior 
probabilities found in the rest of the model space. 
The first assumption that is associated with dominated models is the use of 
population weights to control for heteroskedasticity. This finding suggests that the 
common practice of adding population weights to regressions using county-level or 
state-level data is not supported by the data. As discussed in Section 3, when one 
considers the presence of location-time-specific unobservables in the model, the 
standard argument for using population weights is weakened, and may in fact introduce 
heteroskedasticity, instead of correcting for it. Further, models with weights tend to 
overstate the effect of the laws on the crime rate compared to the models without 
weights. In other words, the models with weights are more likely to find that the laws 
lead to an increase in crime. As a result, the standard use of population weights in the 
literature may be leading to an upward bias in the estimate of the effect of the laws on 
crime in light of the lack of support for the assumption.  
The second assumption associated with dominated likelihoods is the use of 
region-trends to explain the time-series patterns of crime rates (compared to models 
that use time dummies). This finding indicates that the time-series patterns in crime 
rates do not follow a linear trend and are better approximated by flexible time dummies, 
even at the expense of not allowing the time-series pattern to be region-specific. 
The model space described in Figure 2 generates 624 models. Half of this set 
consists of models with population weights, and half of the remaining set consists of 
models which include region trends. After eliminating these dominated models, 156 
models remain for analysis.20 This means that we now examine model uncertainty with 
                                                 
20The product of the dimensions of each remaining element is 216: formulation of the 
law’s effect on crime (3), demographic controls (2), additional covariates (3), parameter 
heterogeneity (6), and IV/non IV (2). However, as discussed above, when we include 
interactions between the effect of shall-issue laws with gun prevalence, urbanization, 
and region we also separately include these variables as controls. As a result some 
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respect to control variables for demographics and location-specific heterogeneity, 
parameter heterogeneity, and instrumental variables.21 
Figure 3 presents dispersion plots which graphically represent the heterogeneity 
in average marginal effects (AME) that appears as one moves across the model space. 
Over a third of the models produce a positive effect of the law on crime, i.e., shall issue 
laws increase crime, whereas the remaining models suggest a negative effect. 
Magnitudes also vary considerably. For violent crime, the estimates range from the law 
implying a decrease in crime of 15% to an increase of 18%, and for property crime 
ranging from a decrease of 15% to an increase of 28%. Based on these results, it is 
easy to see how the concealed carry literature contains such disparate claims. 
Depending on the model chosen by the researcher, the results can vary from a large 
decrease to a large increase in the crime rate. We now examine the sources of this 
heterogeneity in estimated policy effects.  
 
 
8. Assumptions and policy effects 
 
In Table 1 we report the average marginal effects (in particular, the three-year 
average of AME) averaged across each specification within each dimension of the 
model space. For example, with regard to the formulation of the law dimension, there 
are three specifications: “dummy”, “spline”, and “hybrid”. For each of these three 
specifications, we take all models with that specification (e.g., spline) and compute the 
simple unweighted average of the estimated AME across all of those models. Table 1 
illustrates how moving within each dimension of the model space affects the estimated 
effect of the law, on average. For example, in the bottom right corner of Table 1, we can 
see that for violent crime, models which correct for endogeneity (IV) on average suggest 
an increase in crime of 1.4%, whereas models that do not (Non IV) suggest on average 
a reduction of crime by 3.9%.  
                                                                                                                                                             
models already contain the additional covariates (gun prevalence and urban dummies). 
This leaves us with 156 remaining models. 
21In Table A in the Appendix, we present the marginal likelihood values for the non-
dominated models for both violent and property crime. 
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 As a complement to Table 1, in Figures 4A-4F we present the average marginal 
effects (three-year average of AME) for all models. These figures are the same as 
Figures 3A and 3B, except that the models are grouped according to each model 
dimension. For example, Figures 4A and 4B group the models by the formulation of the 
law (i.e., dummy, spline, hybrid). These figures illustrate the degree of heterogeneity 
both across and within each formulation of the law. 
 
i. formulation of shall issue laws as a crime determinant 
 
For both violent and property crime, there is a clear difference in the estimated 
average marginal effects between the dummy, spline, and hybrid models. As can be 
seen in Table 1, on average, the dummy specifications generate positive effects of the 
law, the hybrid generates negative effects, and the spline is in between. Figures 4A and 
4B illustrate that even within these specifications there is a substantial amount of 
heterogeneity. Figure 4A shows that, for violent crime, the dummy model generates the 
largest effects in absolute value, with some versions producing large negative effects of 
the law, and others large positive effects. For property crime, Figure 4B illustrates that 
the average difference between the three specifications in Table 1 is generated 
primarily by the dummy model having positive effects of the law in almost all 
specifications, whereas the spline and dummy model produced almost entirely negative 
effects, but the magnitudes are larger in absolute value for the hybrid models.22 
In every case, the hybrid or spline specification is preferred to the dummy model 
(has a higher marginal likelihood value, see table A in the Appendix), and in most cases 
the hybrid model has a higher marginal likelihood than the spline model. This is 
evidence that the effect of the law not only affects crime upon implementation (via the 
dummy portion of the hybrid model), but also changes the trend in the crime rate (via 
the spline portion).  
Together these results suggest that the effect of legalization of concealed carry is 
heterogeneous over time, and that the use of a single dummy variable is insufficient to 
                                                 
22Interestingly, the paper which introduced the hybrid model, Ayres and Donohue 
(2003), argued against a reduction in crime due to shall issue laws.  
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capture the effect of the law. The hybrid and spline are reduced form ways of allowing 
for this but, as illustrated in Figure 1 and its associated discussion, more work needs to 
be done to investigate the source and implications of this heterogeneity.23 
 
ii. control variables 
 
We next examine the effects of alternative control variable choices. The data 
seem to prefer the specifications with the full set of age and race dummies (36 
dummies) to the black/white subset (12 dummies), with the likelihood for the models 
with a full set of dummies being higher in each case. There is no systematic pattern, 
however, in the estimated average marginal effects, and the average difference is very 
small for both types of crime (less than 1%). So while the full set of demographic 
variables provides a better fit to the data (see Table A in the Appendix), both versions 
provide similar answers to the question of the effect of shall-issue laws on crime. 
For the variables gun prevalence and urbanization, it appears that each is useful 
for helping to explain crime patterns, as they lead to higher marginal likelihood values 
but, as was the case with demographic variables, they generate only small changes in 
the average marginal effects. As we discuss below, the more important impact of these 
additional variables is through allowing the effect of the law to depend on gun 
prevalence and urbanization by interacting them with the law variables. 
 
iii. parameter heterogeneity 
  
 As illustrated in Figures 4C and 4D, when one  allows for the effects of the law to 
be heterogeneous, there is still a lot of heterogeneity within each specification. On 
average, the models that allow for interactions with urbanization generate the highest 
AME’s, and those with region interactions generate the lowest AME’s.  
                                                 
23Black and Nagin (1998) interact the law with a set of five lead and lag dummies, 
allowing the effect of the law to vary over the 11-year period centered around the 
enactment of the law, however they fail to find any statistically significant effects of the 
law on crime. 
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As shown in Table A-1, for violent crime there is a clear pattern in the marginal 
likelihoods, and the models that include interactions of the law and region are preferred 
to the other models, with the models that also include interactions of the law and gun 
prevalence being the most preferred specifications. These two sets of specifications on 
average produce lower effects of the law compared to the other models (small negative 
effects versus effects close to zero). However, as Figure 4C illustrates, the numbers in 
Table 1 mask a large degree of heterogeneity within each group. 
With property crime, the pattern is less clear. The models with interactions are 
universally preferred to the models without any parameter heterogeneity. In some cases 
the models that include interactions with urban dummies and gun prevalence are 
preferred and in a smaller set of cases, the models with region dummy and gun 
prevalence interactions are preferred. As was the case with violent crime, the 
specifications with region interactions and region plus gun prevalence interactions 
generate lower estimated effects of the law (-0.5% and -0.8%) compared to the other 
sets of models which produce small positive effects of the law (around 2%). There is no 
systematic pattern in the AME's for the models with urban interactions, but on average 
they produce the largest positive effects of the law (3.4%) 
In general we find that the effect of shall-issue laws on both property and violent 
crime is increasing and concave in gun prevalence. In other words, the more guns there 
are in the population, the more likely the law leads to an increase in overall crime. One 
potential explanation for this result is that as the number of guns in the population 
increases, any potential deterrent effect of individuals being able to carry concealed 
weapons is mitigated by the increase in the number of guns actively being carried in 
public (as opposed to just being owned). 
When we allow for the effects of the law to vary with the degree of urbanization, 
we also find evidence of heterogeneous effects. For property crime, the effect of the law 
is monotonically decreasing in urbanization. The more urban (rural) a county is, the 
more likely the law will decrease (increase) crime. With violent crime there seems to be 
a similar pattern, although it is less pronounced, particularly with the spline and hybrid 
specifications. 
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The results with regional heterogeneity are harder to interpret. This is partially 
due to differences in the crime trends across regions, which we discussed earlier. For 
violent crime, the dummy model specification suggests that the effect of the law for the 
South is to increase crime (or decrease crime less) relative to the other regions. 
However, once we allow for the effect of the law to vary over time via the spline or 
hybrid models, the result flips, with the law associated with a decrease in crime (or a 
smaller increase in crime) in the South relative to the other regions of the country. 
Moreover, when we also allow the law to interact with gun prevalence, the change is 
even stronger, due to the fact that gun prevalence is higher on average in the South.  
For property crime there is also evidence of heterogeneous effects of the law 
across region, but there is no consistent pattern across models. These results suggest 
that there is important heterogeneity in the effect of shall-issue laws across regions. 
While interacting the effect of the law helps to isolate this heterogeneity and better fit the 
observed patterns of crime, region differences alone do not inform us as to the ultimate 
source of this underlying heterogeneity, something we discuss more in the conclusion. 
 
iv. instrumental variables 
 
When we compare the models which treat the laws and the arrest rate as 
endogenous (IV models) to those in which they are assumed to be exogenous (Non IV 
models), we find that the IV models are preferred to their Non IV counterparts. However, 
the Non IV models are not dominated as a group as was the case with population 
weights and region trends. This implies that although there is strong support for treating 
the laws and arrest rate as endogenous, there are other dimensions of the model space 
that are equally, if not more, important. On average the IV models generate higher 
average marginal effects (5.5 and 0.9 percentage points higher for violent and property 
crime, respectively). Figures 4E and 4F demonstrate the reasons for these differences. 
For violent crime, it is driven by the fact that almost all Non IV models generate negative 
effects of the law, but the IV models generate a roughly even mix of negative and 
positive effects. With property crime, on the other hand, the difference is driven by the 
magnitude of the effects, as opposed to the sign. 
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v. differences across the average marginal effect measures 
 
So far we have focused our discussion on the three-year average of AME, one of 
twelve measures we compute for each model. In many cases the average marginal 
effects vary little, if at all, across the three measures and across the different years in 
which the effect is measured. However, there are two situations for which this is not the 
case, and they are worth highlighting. The first case is when the models contain trends 
(spline/hybrid). The trend component of these specifications produces an effect of the 
law that builds over time, and unless the trend effect is equal to zero, the magnitude of 
the effect depends on how long the law has been in place. In some cases the trend is 
quite large, which makes it difficult to evaluate the effect of the law compared to other 
models. In addition, as the discussion surrounding Figure 1 shows, the linear trend 
specification has the unappealing feature that the magnitude of the effect grows without 
bound. We believe that while the results from these models suggest that there is 
important time-heterogeneity in the effects of the laws, the correct specification of these 
time-effects warrants further research. Furthermore, there may be short-run versus 
long-run trade-offs in terms of the effects of the laws that need to be considered. 
The second situation in which there are important differences across the average 
marginal effects measures are when the models include interactions of the law with 
region. This result is presented graphically in Figure 5. When the average marginal 
effects are computed for states that implemented the law (AME-Law), compared to 
states that did not implement the law (AME-No Law), we see sizeable differences. 
(Recall that our main AME measure is just a weighted average of these two measures.) 
This is reflective of the fact that those regions that were more likely to adopt shall-issue 
laws experienced different effects of the law compared to regions that were less likely to 
adopt. This is an important result to note, particularly to policy-makers trying to decide 
whether to enact such laws. The effects of the law vary across location, and the 
experiences of those that previously enacted the law are not necessarily going to be 
replicated in other locations. 
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This discussion is quite wide ranging. We summarize our findings on the model 
space as follows. 
 
1. In terms of fit (i.e., marginal likelihoods), models that a) allow for heterogeneity 
and b) correct for endogeneity, substantially outperform their counterparts. 
 
2. The effect of the law seems to be very heterogeneous across many dimensions. 
Interacting the law with observables like gun prevalence, region or urban 
dummies shows that a) having more guns seems to reduce the potential 
deterrent effect of the law, b) more urbanization increases the potential deterrent 
effect of the law and c) there seem to be important regional differences in the 
effect of the law on crime.  
 
3. Models that only allow for the effect of the law to shift crime (i.e., dummy models) 
find large and positive effects of the law, models that allow for trends in the effect 
of the law (spline models) find negative but mixed effects of the law, and models 
that allow for both a trend and a shift (hybrid models) tend to find negative but 
small effects (i.e., evidence of weak deterrence).  
 
4. There is little support for the substitution hypothesis of Lott (Lott and Mustard 
(1997), Lott (2000)) in which criminals shift their activity from violent crimes 
towards less confrontational crimes like property crimes.  
 
5. Finally, all results should be interpreted with caution, as there is enormous 
heterogeneity in the estimated effects across models, in terms of the signs, 
magnitudes, and their economic and statistical significance. 
 
 
9. Posterior Probabilities and Model-Averaged Results 
 
37 
 
What conclusions would one draw from a model averaging exercise?  Employing 
a uniform prior distribution over the model space and the marginal likelihoods presented 
in the Appendix, only two models receive posterior probabilities above 1% for violent 
crime. We label these as model A and model B. The specifications for each are listed 
below, based on the characterization of the model space in Figure 2. 
 
• Model A: Hybrid, all demographic controls, no additional covariates, time 
dummies, gun prevalence and region interactions, IV, no population weights. 
 
• Model B: Hybrid, all demographic controls, add urban dummies, time 
dummies, gun prevalence and region interactions, IV, no population weights. 
 
The difference between the two models is that model B also includes urban dummies as 
control variables. The posterior probability weights for model A and model B are 98.4% 
and 1.6%, respectively. 
As can be seen in Table 2, both models produce similar results in terms of the 
AME's. For both models, all three average marginal effect measures suggest a similar 
pattern. First, as a consequence of the shift effect of the dummy for the law, violent 
crime falls by about 10% in the first year after the implementation of the law. However, 
because of the strong positive trend in the effect of the law (which comes from the 
spline component to the hybrid model), this initial deterrent effect is eliminated by the 
third year.24 In fact, because of the linear trend, the effect of the law will become 
positive and increasingly large over time if extended beyond three years. So while there 
is some evidence of an immediate decrease in violent crime, the long-run effect seems 
to be to increase crime, quickly wiping out any initial decrease. 
With property crime, the posterior model probabilities load entirely on one model, 
which we denote as model C. 
 
• Model C: Hybrid, all demographic controls, no additional covariates, time 
dummies, gun prevalence and urban interactions, IV, no population weights. 
 
                                                 
24Note that when the model includes interactions of variables with the law, the AME 
measures will not necessarily follow a simple linear trend over time. In fact, depending 
on how the interacted variables change over time, they need not even be monotone. 
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For property crime there is initially an economically and statistically significant drop in 
crime of 8%. However, as was the case with violent crime, there is a steep positive 
trend in the effect of the law on crime. As a consequence the deterrent effects of the law 
get quickly wiped out and would become increasingly positive if extended over the long 
run.  
Beyond the estimated effects we just presented, the model averaging exercise 
illustrates a pattern that warrants further research. The fact that the data prefers models 
with both dummies and trends on the effect of the law, shows that the law has effects 
that are not only heterogeneous in the cross section (by region, prevalence of guns, etc) 
but with strong time heterogeneity as well. However, the practice of introducing this time 
heterogeneity via simple trends is problematic. For our estimates, the effect on crime of 
introducing guns moves from negative to positive in three to four years and would 
simply continue to grow over time. So it seems important to consider richer 
specifications of the policy effect than have appeared in the literature. 
 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
Relative to the strong claims made by particular papers in the literature, we find 
little evidence that shall-issue right-to-carry laws generate either an increase or 
decrease in crime on average. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence of these laws 
leading to substitution away from violent crime and into property crime. 
However, we do find some interesting results that we believe are revealing as to 
how shall-issue laws affect crime. For both types of crime, the degree of gun prevalence 
in a county is an important determinant of how the law affects crime. Interestingly, for 
violent crime, heterogeneity across regions is also important, whereas the level of 
urbanization is more important for property crime. While there are regional differences in 
urbanization, it appears that there are other differences across region that drive violent 
crime. With property crime, the level of urbanization seems to be an important 
difference that transcends regional boundaries.  
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Urban areas differ from rural areas in how closely people live to one another. 
Property crimes, by definition, do not involve confrontations with victims. Therefore, it 
seems natural that concealed-carry laws could have different effects on crime in areas 
in which potential witnesses to property crimes (who may be carrying concealed 
weapons) are more dispersed compared to areas in which they are tightly clustered. 
Alternatively, it may be easier to carry a concealed weapon regularly in a rural area in 
which there may be fewer places in which weapons are not allowed, such as mass 
transit and state or federal facilities, resulting in differential usage of the law in rural 
versus urban locations. 
For violent crimes, with the exception of murder, there is always at least one 
witness to the crime, the victim. Therefore, the fact that there might be other armed 
witnesses might be less relevant for these crimes. Of course, our finding that 
urbanization matters more for property crimes, and region matters more for violent 
crimes, does not mean that urbanization is not relevant. Rather, it reveals that there are 
other factors that vary across regions, which are more important. The use of region 
interactions helps to identify the level at which these differences exist, but does not 
provide any direct evidence as to the underlying mechanism. Attitudes towards 
violence, gun safety, and gun usage in general are examples of potential differences.  
We believe that, in particular, our results related to parameter heterogeneity 
highlight an area of research that is currently underdeveloped in the literature. The fact 
that interacting the effect of the law with time trends and region helps to better explain 
crime patterns in the data, suggests the presence of important sources of heterogeneity 
that are not captured by current models of crime. 
We can speculate as to the underlying mechanisms at work here, and we can try 
to identify additional observable variables to include in the model. However, progress 
will, we believe, primarily depend on the introduction of a more structural approach to 
the analysis of shall issue laws. The assumptions underlying both the theories that 
predict the law will lead to an increase in crime and those that predict a decrease all 
involve individuals making different decisions in the presence of concealed-carry laws. 
Therefore, incorporating this behavior into the model could be useful in several 
dimensions. It would impose constraints on the set of empirical models consistent with 
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the theory. In addition, it would generate testable restrictions that the researcher could 
evaluate with the available data. 
An example of where a more structured approach to modeling crime would help 
arises in our finding that a time-varying effect of the law is important to explain the 
patterns in the data. Without a model that explains why these temporal patterns arise, it 
is not clear how to interpret these changes or how useful it is to even estimate them as 
opposed to just recovering some “average” effect of the policy. Is this heterogeneity a 
consequence of restrictions on the “technology” of crime commission, and hence the 
policy fundamentally alters how criminals commit crimes? Are these patterns the 
consequence of changes in expectations by the agents, and what we see is simply a 
temporary effect while agents “figure” out how to identify gun-carrying individuals, for 
example? Do they arise because of interactions with other (potentially unmeasured) 
laws that also change over time, etc.? The answers to these questions have different 
implications for both policy evaluation (e.g., we may not be able to estimate the effect 
independently of other policies) and implementation (e.g., packages of policies, either 
concurrently or in particular sequences, may be more effective).25 
                                                 
25 See for example Murphy (2003), Heckman and Navarro (2007), and Cooley, Navarro 
and Takahashi (2014) for a discussion of issues surrounding time-varying treatment 
effects. 
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Figure 4A: Average Marginal Effects - By Law Specification - Violent Crime
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Note: Each bar represents a specific model's three-year average effect of introducing a shall-issue law, computed 
for all states using their characteristics in 1998-2000 (AME).
Figure 4B: Average Marginal Effects - By Law Specification - Property Crime
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Note: Each bar represents a specific model's three-year average effect of introducing a shall-issue law, computed 
for all states using their characteristics in 1998-2000 (AME). GP and GP2 stand for gun prevalence and gun 
prevalence squared.
Figure 4C: Average Marginal Effects - Parameter Heterogeneity - Violent Crime
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Note: Each bar represents a specific model's three-year average effect of introducing a shall-issue law, computed 
for all states using their characteristics in 1998-2000 (AME). GP and GP2 stand for gun prevalence and gun 
prevalence squared.
Figure 4D: Average Marginal Effects - Parameter Heterogeneity - Property Crime
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Note: Each bar represents a specific model's three-year average effect of introducing a shall-issue law, computed 
for all states using their characteristics in 1998-2000 (AME).
Figure 4E: Average Marginal Effects - IV versus Non-IV Specifications - Violent Crime
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Note: Each bar represents a specific model's three-year average effect of introducing a shall-issue law, computed 
for all states using their characteristics in 1998-2000 (AME).
Figure 4F: Average Marginal Effects - IV versus Non-IV Specifications - Property Crime
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Figure 5A: Differences in the Average Marginal Effects:
Models with Region Interactions ‐ Violent Crime
AME‐Law ‐ AME‐No Law
Note: Each bar represents the difference between AME‐Law and AME‐No Law, for each model that contains interactions of the law with region dummies.  AME‐Law is the three‐year 
average marginal effect for those states that implemented the law, evaluated using the characteristics of those states that implemented the law.  AME‐No Law is the same, except that 
it is evaluated for those states that did not implement the law.
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Figure 5B: Differences in the Average Marginal Effects:
Models with Region Interactions ‐ Property Crime
AME‐Law ‐ AME‐No Law
Note: Each bar represents the difference between AME‐Law and AME‐No Law, for each model that contains interactions of the law with region dummies.  AME‐Law is the three‐year 
average marginal effect for those states that implemented the law, evaluated using the characteristics of those states that implemented the law.  AME‐No Law is the same, except that 
it is evaluated for those states that did not implement the law.
Model Dimension Specification Property Violent
Dummy 10.2% 0.2%
Formulation of the Law Spline  ‐2.2% ‐0.2%
Hybrid ‐3.6% ‐3.7%
All 1.5% ‐1.0%
Collapsed 1.5% ‐1.4%
None 1.7% ‐0.9%
Additional Regressors Urban 0.8% ‐1.7%
GP and GP2 1.8% ‐1.3%
None 2.6% ‐0.4%
GP and GP2 2.2% 0.3%
Urban 3.4% 0.7%
Region ‐0.5% ‐3.6%
GP, GP2, and Urban 3.1% 0.6%
GP, GP2, and Region ‐0.8% ‐3.3%
Non IV 1.0% ‐3.9%
IV 1.9% 1.4%
Interactions
Table 1: Average of AME Across Specifications
IV 
Notes: Each panel of Table 1 corresponds to one dimension of the model space described in 
Figure 1. For a given panel, each row contains the simple unweighted average of the 
estimated marginal effects (in particular AME) of all models that include the model 
specification for that row. For example, consider the "Formulation of the Law" panel. The 
row labeled "Dummy" presents the average marginal effect across all models that use the 
dummy variable specification for the law, average across all other model dimension 
specifications.
AME is the three‐year average marginal effect averaged across all states (including those 
that did not implement the law), using their characteristics in 1998‐2000.
GP and GP2 stand for gun prevalence and gun prevalence squared.
Demographics
Violent Crime
Posterior
Probability
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average
Model A 98.4% ‐10.29% ‐5.36% ‐0.63% ‐5.43% ‐8.79% ‐3.89% 0.83% ‐3.95% ‐13.78% ‐8.78% ‐4.05% ‐8.87%
(4.88%) (4.60%) (4.51%) (4.57%) (2.51%) (2.28%) (2.27%) (2.24%) (20.15%) (16.49%) (12.45%) (16.50%)
Model B 1.6% ‐11.27% ‐6.13% ‐1.32% ‐6.24% ‐9.17% ‐4.15% 0.56% ‐4.25% ‐16.20% ‐10.75% ‐5.73% ‐10.89%
(4.98%) (4.81%) (4.74%) (4.76%) (2.46%) (2.31%) (2.30%) (2.27%) (22.71%) (18.21%) (13.41%) (18.24%)
Model‐Averaged Results ‐10.30% ‐5.37% ‐0.64% ‐5.44% ‐8.80% ‐3.90% 0.82% ‐3.96% ‐13.82% ‐8.81% ‐4.08% ‐8.90%
(4.88%) (4.60%) (4.51%) (4.57%) (2.51%) (2.28%) (2.27%) (2.24%) (20.20%) (16.52%) (12.46%) (16.53%)
Property Crime
Posterior
Probability
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Average
Model C 100.0% ‐8.04% ‐6.64% ‐1.42% ‐5.37% ‐10.04% ‐7.46% ‐1.58% ‐6.36% ‐3.37% ‐4.72% ‐1.04% ‐3.04%
(1.77%) (1.24%) (1.23%) (1.31%) (1.51%) (1.12%) (1.16%) (1.15%) (1.64%) (1.18%) (1.20%) (1.23%)
Notes: Model A is the hybrid specification that includes the full set of demographic controls, no additional covariates, time dummies, interactions with gun prevalence and region dummies, instrumental variables, and no population 
weights.  Model B is the same as model A, except that it also includes urban dummies.  Model C is the hybrid specification that includes the full set of demographic controls, no additional covariates, time dummies, interactions with gun 
prevalence and urban dummies, instrumental variables, and no population weights. 
AME is the average marginal effect for all states using their characteristics in 1998‐2000.  AME‐Law and AME‐No Law are the average marginal effects for states that introduced shall‐issue laws, and those that did not, during the sample 
period, also using their characteristics in 1998‐2000.
Standard errors of the average marginal effects are given in italics and parentheses below the point estimates.
Table 2: Model Averaging Results
AME AME‐Law AME‐No Law
AME AME‐Law AME‐No Law
Appendix
Formulation of the 
Laws Demographics Additional Covariates Parameter Heterogeneity
Instrumental 
Variables
Dummy All None None Non IV -11,242.22
Dummy All None None IV -11,224.72
Dummy All None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,217.36
Dummy All None GP and GP squared IV -11,174.96
Dummy All None Urban Non IV -11,233.48
Dummy All None Urban IV -11,204.32
Dummy All None Region Non IV -11,176.49
Dummy All None Region IV -11,130.16
Dummy All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,206.28
Dummy All None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,141.55
Dummy All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,151.07
Dummy All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,101.91
Dummy All Urban None Non IV -11,244.94
Dummy All Urban None IV -11,227.50
Dummy All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,217.94
Dummy All Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,175.55
Dummy All Urban Region Non IV -11,177.45
Dummy All Urban Region IV -11,134.22
Dummy All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,150.61
Dummy All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,097.53
Dummy All GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,222.65
Dummy All GP and GP Squared None IV -11,198.33
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,204.10
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,174.17
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,147.64
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Region IV -11,108.19
Dummy Subset None None Non IV -11,362.38
Dummy Subset None None IV -11,336.19
Dummy Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,330.57
Dummy Subset None GP and GP squared IV -11,285.21
Dummy Subset None Urban Non IV -11,350.05
Dummy Subset None Urban IV -11,309.89
Dummy Subset None Region Non IV -11,276.61
Dummy Subset None Region IV -11,220.49
Dummy Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,321.74
Dummy Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,263.81
Dummy Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,249.56
Dummy Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,199.36
Dummy Subset Urban None Non IV -11,361.00
Dummy Subset Urban None IV -11,335.35
Dummy Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,333.56
Dummy Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,282.91
Dummy Subset Urban Region Non IV -11,271.77
Dummy Subset Urban Region IV -11,223.64
Dummy Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,244.30
Dummy Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,197.51
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,333.37
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared None IV -11,308.00
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,319.82
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,287.86
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,247.08
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV -11,194.02
Spline All None None Non IV -11,201.21
Spline All None None IV -11,191.88
Spline All None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,162.99
Spline All None GP and GP squared IV -11,154.59
Spline All None Urban Non IV -11,190.34
Spline All None Urban IV -11,177.13
Spline All None Region Non IV -11,047.72
Spline All None Region IV -11,031.52
Spline All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,153.05
Spline All None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,145.71
Model Specification Log
Likelihood
Table A-1: Likelihood - Violent Crime
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Table A-1: Likelihood - Violent Crime
Spline All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,010.15
Spline All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -10,989.16
Spline All Urban None Non IV -11,207.88
Spline All Urban None IV -11,189.44
Spline All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,164.09
Spline All Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,147.95
Spline All Urban Region Non IV -11,044.80
Spline All Urban Region IV -11,024.41
Spline All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,010.67
Spline All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -10,986.65
Spline All GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,172.23
Spline All GP and GP Squared None IV -11,170.06
Spline All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,169.72
Spline All GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,149.68
Spline All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,023.77
Spline All GP and GP Squared Region IV -11,000.20
Spline Subset None None Non IV -11,315.77
Spline Subset None None IV -11,309.07
Spline Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,276.66
Spline Subset None GP and GP squared IV -11,265.98
Spline Subset None Urban Non IV -11,307.73
Spline Subset None Urban IV -11,301.93
Spline Subset None Region Non IV -11,109.00
Spline Subset None Region IV -11,089.59
Spline Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,268.49
Spline Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,261.69
Spline Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,078.95
Spline Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,053.04
Spline Subset Urban None Non IV -11,315.58
Spline Subset Urban None IV -11,308.66
Spline Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,278.49
Spline Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,264.29
Spline Subset Urban Region Non IV -11,109.74
Spline Subset Urban Region IV -11,091.26
Spline Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,076.97
Spline Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,058.96
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,287.52
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared None IV -11,272.11
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,281.43
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,273.62
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,087.27
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV -11,066.30
Hybrid All None None Non IV -11,199.55
Hybrid All None None IV -11,176.68
Hybrid All None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,164.71
Hybrid All None GP and GP squared IV -11,130.04
Hybrid All None Urban Non IV -11,184.51
Hybrid All None Urban IV -11,114.25
Hybrid All None Region Non IV -11,042.83
Hybrid All None Region IV -10,958.30
Hybrid All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,145.67
Hybrid All None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,070.62
Hybrid All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,012.75
Hybrid All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -10,939.45
Hybrid All Urban None Non IV -11,201.32
Hybrid All Urban None IV -11,186.59
Hybrid All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,163.99
Hybrid All Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,134.94
Hybrid All Urban Region Non IV -11,044.94
Hybrid All Urban Region IV -10,960.88
Hybrid All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,014.65
Hybrid All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -10,937.17
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,175.47
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared None IV -11,151.44
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Table A-1: Likelihood - Violent Crime
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,157.70
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,087.99
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,022.16
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Region IV -10,945.36
Hybrid Subset None None Non IV -11,310.76
Hybrid Subset None None IV -11,294.48
Hybrid Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV -11,275.16
Hybrid Subset None GP and GP squared IV -11,240.00
Hybrid Subset None Urban Non IV -11,301.91
Hybrid Subset None Urban IV -11,226.82
Hybrid Subset None Region Non IV -11,109.62
Hybrid Subset None Region IV -11,037.95
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV -11,264.54
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV -11,179.98
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,078.71
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,009.37
Hybrid Subset Urban None Non IV -11,311.57
Hybrid Subset Urban None IV -11,292.76
Hybrid Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV -11,277.29
Hybrid Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV -11,241.19
Hybrid Subset Urban Region Non IV -11,112.13
Hybrid Subset Urban Region IV -11,041.68
Hybrid Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -11,076.92
Hybrid Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV -11,011.94
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV -11,285.91
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared None IV -11,269.28
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV -11,270.35
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV -11,203.07
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -11,089.35
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV -11,018.35
Note: Each line corresponds to a specific model. Every specification includes time dummies instead of region trends and assumes errors are homoskedastic. 
GP stands for gun prevalence.  For a description of the various modeling assumptions see Section 3.
Formulation of the 
Laws Demographics Additional Covariates Parameter Heterogeneity
Instrumental 
Variables
Dummy All None None Non IV 233.23
Dummy All None None IV 248.69
Dummy All None GP and GP squared Non IV 264.50
Dummy All None GP and GP squared IV 427.66
Dummy All None Urban Non IV 262.56
Dummy All None Urban IV 340.95
Dummy All None Region Non IV 239.77
Dummy All None Region IV 379.08
Dummy All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 296.97
Dummy All None GP, GP squared and Region IV 481.70
Dummy All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 265.53
Dummy All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 397.51
Dummy All Urban None Non IV 250.91
Dummy All Urban None IV 271.55
Dummy All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 288.64
Dummy All Urban GP and GP squared IV 440.45
Dummy All Urban Region Non IV 259.11
Dummy All Urban Region IV 395.84
Dummy All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 287.17
Dummy All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 411.07
Dummy All GP and GP Squared None Non IV 265.23
Dummy All GP and GP Squared None IV 293.02
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 297.79
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Urban IV 369.76
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV 266.91
Dummy All GP and GP Squared Region IV 410.53
Dummy Subset None None Non IV -49.76
Dummy Subset None None IV -22.85
Dummy Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV -9.29
Dummy Subset None GP and GP squared IV 200.22
Dummy Subset None Urban Non IV -26.66
Dummy Subset None Urban IV 74.90
Dummy Subset None Region Non IV -43.75
Dummy Subset None Region IV 148.68
Dummy Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 11.25
Dummy Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV 265.68
Dummy Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV -8.96
Dummy Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 148.77
Dummy Subset Urban None Non IV -35.13
Dummy Subset Urban None IV -12.59
Dummy Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 6.81
Dummy Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV 218.27
Dummy Subset Urban Region Non IV -30.15
Dummy Subset Urban Region IV 164.70
Dummy Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 13.84
Dummy Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 160.42
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV -10.51
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared None IV 23.43
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 10.33
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV 117.20
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV -0.99
Dummy Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV 191.19
Spline All None None Non IV 377.52
Spline All None None IV 383.46
Spline All None GP and GP squared Non IV 443.19
Spline All None GP and GP squared IV 443.79
Spline All None Urban Non IV 427.93
Spline All None Urban IV 431.15
Spline All None Region Non IV 418.52
Spline All None Region IV 446.14
Spline All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 487.61
Spline All None GP, GP squared and Region IV 497.47
Spline All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 471.59
Spline All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 502.93
Model Specification Log
Likelihood
Table A-2: Likelihood - Property Crime
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Table A-2: Likelihood - Property Crime
Spline All Urban None Non IV 396.97
Spline All Urban None IV 397.55
Spline All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 456.96
Spline All Urban GP and GP squared IV 463.45
Spline All Urban Region Non IV 432.03
Spline All Urban Region IV 460.22
Spline All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 483.07
Spline All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 523.32
Spline All GP and GP Squared None Non IV 405.97
Spline All GP and GP Squared None IV 409.13
Spline All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 454.61
Spline All GP and GP Squared Urban IV 463.59
Spline All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV 445.17
Spline All GP and GP Squared Region IV 478.43
Spline Subset None None Non IV 136.21
Spline Subset None None IV 147.18
Spline Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV 213.20
Spline Subset None GP and GP squared IV 219.69
Spline Subset None Urban Non IV 177.40
Spline Subset None Urban IV 187.87
Spline Subset None Region Non IV 203.34
Spline Subset None Region IV 248.28
Spline Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 253.79
Spline Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV 269.16
Spline Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 263.57
Spline Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 329.28
Spline Subset Urban None Non IV 148.28
Spline Subset Urban None IV 158.74
Spline Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 222.91
Spline Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV 240.99
Spline Subset Urban Region Non IV 206.98
Spline Subset Urban Region IV 262.17
Spline Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 276.46
Spline Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 339.96
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV 176.75
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared None IV 185.47
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 207.90
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV 226.78
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV 230.26
Spline Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV 285.39
Hybrid All None None Non IV 381.07
Hybrid All None None IV 394.60
Hybrid All None GP and GP squared Non IV 446.83
Hybrid All None GP and GP squared IV 565.83
Hybrid All None Urban Non IV 421.54
Hybrid All None Urban IV 477.27
Hybrid All None Region Non IV 416.40
Hybrid All None Region IV 543.32
Hybrid All None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 488.09
Hybrid All None GP, GP squared and Region IV 631.10
Hybrid All None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 476.75
Hybrid All None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 590.70
Hybrid All Urban None Non IV 389.60
Hybrid All Urban None IV 409.74
Hybrid All Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 460.52
Hybrid All Urban GP and GP squared IV 577.34
Hybrid All Urban Region Non IV 439.30
Hybrid All Urban Region IV 554.43
Hybrid All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 488.51
Hybrid All Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 609.02
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared None Non IV 409.34
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared None IV 420.11
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 447.47
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Urban IV 507.47
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Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Region Non IV 449.01
Hybrid All GP and GP Squared Region IV 566.61
Hybrid Subset None None Non IV 141.73
Hybrid Subset None None IV 159.32
Hybrid Subset None GP and GP squared Non IV 219.68
Hybrid Subset None GP and GP squared IV 359.91
Hybrid Subset None Urban Non IV 176.36
Hybrid Subset None Urban IV 244.31
Hybrid Subset None Region Non IV 210.91
Hybrid Subset None Region IV 336.90
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP squared and Region Non IV 258.89
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP squared and Region IV 421.51
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 282.32
Hybrid Subset None GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 398.91
Hybrid Subset Urban None Non IV 150.94
Hybrid Subset Urban None IV 167.23
Hybrid Subset Urban GP and GP squared Non IV 233.37
Hybrid Subset Urban GP and GP squared IV 368.08
Hybrid Subset Urban Region Non IV 221.06
Hybrid Subset Urban Region IV 341.10
Hybrid Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban Non IV 288.24
Hybrid Subset Urban GP, GP Squared and Urban IV 407.67
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared None Non IV 175.73
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared None IV 198.18
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Urban Non IV 217.74
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Urban IV 280.53
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Region Non IV 231.38
Hybrid Subset GP and GP Squared Region IV 371.20
Note: Each line corresponds to a specific model. Every specification includes time dummies instead of region trends and assumes errors are homoskedastic. 
GP stands for gun prevalence.  For a description of the various modeling assumptions see Section 3.
